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Masson v. New Yorker Magazine:1 Actual Malice and
Direct Quotations-The Constitutional Right to Lie.
The use of quotation marks is generally not controversial. Most peo-
ple understand their significance. Statements in quotation marks not
only convey to the reader the speaker's thoughts, they also convey the
speaker's exact words. This understanding is not only commonplace, it
is entirely consistent with common journalistic practice.2
In a recent decision, however, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
has set forth a different understanding which changes the meaning of
quotation marks. According to the court, as long as words are the ra-
tional interpretation of a speaker's actual words, they too may be placed
in quotation marks.3 This decision raises the question-what remains of
the quotation mark?
In Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, the Ninth Circuit declined to infer
actual malice from evidence showing that quoted statements did not
contain the plaintiff's exact words. The court held that as long as the
statement within quotation marks either (1) represented a rational inter-
pretation of ambiguous remarks, or (2) did not alter the substantive con-
tent of unambiguous remarks actually made, the court would not infer
actual malice.4 This decision sparked a debate among members of the
media about the proper use of quotations and has some commentators
speculating that the decision provides the media with a constitutional
right to lie.5
This Comment reviews the Ninth Circuit's decision, including the
case law on which its holding depends. Part I of this Comment presents
the relevant facts and holdings in Masson. Part II briefly discusses the
defamation cause of action and the Supreme Court decisions relevant to
Masson. Part III analyzes the Ninth Circuit's decision and specifically, the
test the court applies. Part III also reviews the case law on which the
court depends and suggests that these cases do not support the Ninth
1 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989), aff'g 686 F. Supp. 1396 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
2 See H. GOODWIN, GROPING FOR ETHICS INJOURNALISM 171 (1983) ("Quotation marks are sup-
posed to say to the reader, '[w]hat's inside here are the exact words of whoever is being quoted.
Verbatim.' "); B. HENDERSON, How TO BULLET-PROOF YOUR MANUSCRIPT 60 (1986) ("When you put
quotation marks on either side of a statement, it is sacrosanct. These words and the meaning of
them belong not to [the writer] but to the person who is quoted."). Note that practicingjournalists
also subscribe to a selective use of quotation marks. See infra note 5.
3 Masson, 881 F.2d at 1456.
4 Id.
5 See, e.g., Warren, To tell the truth, Has the court given journalists a right to lie?, Chicago Tribune,
Aug. 30, 1989, § C (Tempo), at 1, col. 1 ("To invoke the right to deliberately distort what someone
else has said is to assert the right to lie in print."); Henry, The Right to Fake Quotes: A Journalist's Legal
Victory Raises Questions About Ethics, TIME, Aug. 21, 1989, at 49 (quoting Bill Monroe, editor for the
Washington journalism Review: "I don't see how any journalist can be happy with a judge condon-
ing tampering with specific quotes."); Rosenstiel, Wide Respect For Sanctity Of The Spoken Word; Most
Newspapers Have Strict Rules On Quotes, Los Angeles Times, Aug. 5, 1989, § 1, at 29, col. 1 (quoting
Jane Chusmir, editor of the Miami Herald: "We believe if it is in quotes it should be what the person
said." Also quoting Shelby Coffee, editor of the Los Angeles Times: "When we use quote marks,
what's inside those quote marks should be what the person said.").
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Circuit's holding in Masson. This discussion also asserts that the court
improperly expanded the definition of actual malice with implications
for, and potentially adverse effects on, future defamation cases. More-
over, Part III suggests that technological advances and current journalis-
tic practice render the court's decision inappropriate. Part IV of the
Comment recommends a more effective approach to evaluating actual
malice in cases of erroneous quotation and discusses the potential advan-
tages of such an approach. Lastly, Part V concludes that the Ninth Cir-
cuit's decision is incorrect and should be overturned.
I. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine
In 198 1,Jeffrey Masson was fired from his position as Projects Direc-
tor for the Sigmund Freud Archives. 6 Janet Malcolm, an independent
journalist, interviewed Masson in 1982 about the controversy surround-
ing his tenure at the Archives. 7 A series of interviews spanning many
months led to an article published in two successive issues of The New
Yorker magazine8 and subsequently served as the basis for a book written
by Malcolm and published by Alfred Knopf, Inc. titled In the Freud
Archives.9
Masson sued Malcolm, The New Yorker, and Alfred Knopf, Inc., claim-
ing that the article repeatedly misquoted him and that it portrayed him as
"egotistical, vain and lacking in personal honesty and moral integrity."' 0
Specifically, Masson alleged that Malcolm fabricated numerous state-
ments that the article attributed directly to him." Masson sued Malcolm
and the other defendants for defamation and invasion of privacy.' 2 The
district court granted partial summary judgment for all defendants as to
four of Masson's allegations on August 19, 1986,13 and summary judg-
ment as to the remaining eight allegations on August 17, 1987.14
6 Brief for Appellant at 4, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 881 F.2d 1452 (9th Cir. 1989) (Nos.
87-2665; 87-2700) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. Masson accepted the position in 1980. Id.
From 1975 to 1980 he was a full professor of Sanskrit and Indian Studies at the University of To-
ronto. Ide He trained in psychoanalysis from 1970 to 1978 when he graduated as a psychoanalyst.
IdL
7 Id at 5. See also Brief for Appellees at 4, Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 881 F.2d 1452 (9th
Cir. 1989) (Nos. 87-2665, 87-2700). The controversy related to Masson's claims that he had located
in the Archives evidence to support his contention that Freud abandoned his Seduction Theory
which linked adult psychological trauma to childhood sexual abuse. Masson claimed that his discov-
eries were suppressed by Anna Freud and Kurt Eissler, the other Directors of the Archives. Brief for
Appellant, supra note 6, at 4.
8 Malcolm, Annals of Scholarship: Trouble in the Archives, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 5, 1983 (Part I)
and Malcolm, Annals of Scholarship: Trouble in the Archives, THE NEw YORKER, Dec. 12, 1983 (Part II).
9 See J. MALCOLM, IN THE FREUD ARCHIVES (1984).
10 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1397 (N.D. Cal. 1987), aft'd, 881 F.2d
1452 (9th Cir. 1989).
11 Id. at 1397.
12 The district court noted that Masson agreed that the malice standard for privacy is the same as
for defamation. Id at 1407 & n.7. As such, neither the district court nor the Ninth Circuit addressed
this cause of action in their opinions. See also Masson, 881 F.2d at 1463. ,
13 Masson, 686 F. Supp. at 1397 & n.2. In his fourth amended complaint, Masson identified 12
quotations that he alleged were libelous. The district court granted summary judgment as to four of
them. Id at 1397.
14 Id
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On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reviewed the allegedly defamatory
passages to determine whether a jury could find actual malice solely from
evidence demonstrating that the quotations were fabricated. The Ninth
Circuit reviewed de novo the trial court's grant of summary judgment, 15
and by applying principles of law adopted from other circuits, the court
affirmed the district court's grant.16
II. Defamation and the Actual Malice Standard
Defamation is a cause of action stemming from injury to a person's
reputation. The term defamation refers to either the libel 17 or slander 8
cause of action. Although libel and slander developed as independent
causes of action with origins rooted in the English common law,' 9 the
Supreme Court decision in New York Times v. Sullivan 20 merged the two
actions as far as their constitutional requirements are concerned. Since
the dispute in Masson centered around a magazine article, the appropri-
ate cause of action was libel.
To recover on an action for libel, a plaintiff must establish a prima
facie case demonstrating that a defendant (1) published (2) a defamatory
statement about the plaintiff (3) that is false and (4) with the proper in-
tent to publish the defamation. 21 The common law component of libel
that has undergone the most change as a result of Sullivan is that of in-
tent. The Court has replaced the concept of intent with the term actual
15 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 881 F.2d 1452, 1453 (9th Cir. 1989).
16 Id. at 1464.
17 Libel is a "method of defamation expressed by print, writing, pictures or signs." BLAcK's LAW
DIGTIONARY 824 (5th ed. 1979).
18 Slander is a "method of defamation expressed by oral expression or transitory gestures." Id.
at 1244.
19 W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 772
(5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter PROSSER]. In England, defamation did not constitute a common law
cause of action until the 16th century. Id. Previously, such actions fell under the jurisdiction of
seigniorial, and then later, ecclesiastical courts. Id. These courts regarded slander as a sin, with
punishment of penance. W. PROSSER, J. WADE & V. SCHWARTZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 853
(8th ed. 1988) [hereinafter CASEBOOK]. As these courts faded in influence, the common law courts
began to assume jurisdiction over slander as a tort action. Id. The basis for this jurisdiction was the
presence of temporal harm separate from the spiritual harm. Id.
Beginning in the 17th century, the Court of Star Chamber began independently to punish the
crime of political libel. PROSSER, supra, at 772. Its objective was to suppress political sedition that
had grown popular with the advent of printing. Id. The action subsequently expanded to include
non-political libel and tort damages were permitted, possibly as a substitute for dueling, which had
been outlawed. CASEBOOK, supra, at 854.
This evolution has caused slander and libel to develop as distinct doctrines with special rules
unique to each. This remained true even after the decline of the Star Chamber when the common
law courts assumed jurisdiction over both causes of action. While the causes of action remained
separate, the term defamation is commonly used to refer to either tort.
The proliferation of libel and slander actions in England and the general support for free speech
and press in the United States resulted in these causes of action being disfavored by the courts.
PROSSER, supra, at 772. In the United States, the Supreme Court permanently altered the develop-
ment of both doctrines in 1964 when it constitutionalized the area of defamation with regard to the
protection guaranteed by the first amendment in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270,
279-80 (1964) (discussing the constitutional need for the actual malice standard).
20 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
21 PROSSER, supra note 19, at 802. See note 90 for a discussion of plaintiff's burden of proving
falsity.
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malice.22 Trying to determine exactly what constitutes actual malice has
been much litigated and was an important issue in Masson.
A. Intent-The Actual Malice Standard
Citing the need for uninhibited, robust debate on public issues, the
Supreme Court extended the constitutional protection of free speech
and press to libelous statements in Sullivan.23 In that case, the Court
held that for a public official24 to recover damages for a defamatory false-
hood, he must prove that the statement was made with "actual malice." 25
Actual malice does not refer to any ill-will or bad motive but rather to a
certain level of awareness as to whether the statement was false.26 The
Supreme Court has never completely defined actual malice 27 but has
held that it includes situations where a defendant has falsely published a
statement with either a "high degree of awareness of... probable fal-
sity" 28 or "serious doubts as to the truth [or falsity of the] publication." 29
This definition is vague and has sparked much litigation regarding what
constitutes actual malice. The Masson court noted that the Supreme
Court has never addressed whether a court may infer actual malice solely
from evidence that defamatory statements presented in quotation marks
are not the exact words of the speaker. 30
B. Actual Malice and Summary Judgment
The concept of actual malice raises a separate issue in the context of
summary judgment. The issue involves the constraints under which a
judge operates when evaluating a defendant's motion for summary judg-
ment in defamation actions. The Supreme Court responded to criticism
that traditional summary judgment procedures 31 were inconsistent with
22 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80.
23 Id
24 Sullivan dealt with a public official defendant and statements made in reference to his official
capacity. The Supreme Court subsequently extended the actual malice standard to public figure
plaintiffs. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-45 (1974) (extends application of the
Sullivan standard to public figures but not to private individuals). Masson admitted that he was a
public figure and that he was required to prove Malcolm was "motivated by actual malice." Masson
v. New Yorker Magazine, 881 F.2d 1452, 1453 (9th Cir. 1989).
25 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80. The Court defined actual malice as "knowledge that it was false
or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id.
26 See infra note 83 noting this distinction between actual malice and ill-will.
27 See Harte-Hanks Comm., Inc. v. Connoughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2685 (1989) ("the concept of
reckless disregard' 'cannot be fully encompassed in one infallible definition.' "') (citing St. Amant v.
Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730 (1968)).
28 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (discussing the Sullivan standard).
29 St. Amant, 390 U.S. at 731.
30 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 881 F.2d 1452, 1454 (9th Cir. 1989). Note at the outset that
an affirmative answer to this question would not lead to a finding of actual malice for every acciden-
tal or insignificant misquotation. To satisfy the Sullivan standard for actual malice, the evidence
must indicate that any misquotation was a result of intentional or reckless disregard of falsity. See
infra note 90 and accompanying text for a further illustration of this point.
31 Traditional summary judgment doctrine provides that the party moving for summary judg-
ment must set forth "specific facts showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact at trial."
FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Critics argued that it was inconsistent with the first amendment to require a
defendant on a summary judgment motion to disprove the existence of actual malice when the plain-
tiff would bear a heavy burden to establish its existence at trial. For further discussion of actual
malice in the context of summary judgment, see infra note 32.
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the aims of the first amendment.32 In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby 33 the Court
held that, for purposes of summary judgment, a trial judge must bear in
mind the heightened burden of proof that a plaintiff bears at trial. 34 Spe-
cifically, the Court instructed judges to consider whether a plaintiff's evi-
dence could support a reasonable jury finding that the plaintiff had
shown actual malice with convincing clarity.3 5
Even after Liberty Lobby, however, the judge's role remains unclear.
In dictum, the Liberty Lobby Court told judges to "bear in mind" the ac-
tual quantum and quality of proof offered.3 6 At the same time, the Court
admonished judges not to make credibility determinations, weigh evi-
dence or draw legitimate inferences from the evidence. 37 Such confusion
over exactly how a judge is to bear in mind the heightened burden of
proof when deciding a motion for summary judgment has led lower
courts to apply Liberty Lobby inconsistently and has led to the faulty deci-
sion in Masson.38
32 Some judges and commentators believe that in matters affecting the first amendment, sum-
mary proceedings are essential because even the pendency of a libel action inhibits free speech. See,
e.g., Matheson, Procedure In Public Person Defamation Cases: The Impact of the First Amendment, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 215, 285 (1987) (citing Thompson v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 394 F.2d 774, 776 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 884 (1968)).
Citing congestion in the federal courts and the prohibitive cost of litigation, judges have com-
monly granted defendants' motions for summary judgment in direct violation of established sum-
mary judgment doctrine. See Louis, Summary Judgment and the Actual Malice Controversy in Constitutional
Defamation Cases, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 707, 710 (1984) (citing a study showing that between 1976 and
1980, 75% of all motions for summary judgment made by defendants on the issue of actual malice
were granted). This practice of preferring summary judgment in defamation cases became so preva-
lent that courts had begun to call this "the rule" in such cases. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 431
F. Supp. 1311, 1330 (W.D. Wis. 1977) ("In making this [actual malice] determination, the granting
of summary judgment may well be the 'rule' rather than the 'exception.' ") (citations omitted). Re-
jecting this characterization of the law, ChiefJustice Burger stated: "considering the nuances of the
issues raised here, we are constrained to express some doubt about the so-called 'rule.' The proof of
'actual malice' calls a defendant's state of mind into question ... and does not readily lend itself to
summary disposition." Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 120 n.9 (1979).
Lower courts apparently did not heed Chief Justice Burger's warning and continued to grant
summary judgment as often as before. See Matheson, supra, at 289-90 & n.430 (study showing that in
the two years following Hutchinson, 1980-81, 83% of all defendants' summary judgment motions
were granted, while between 1982 and 1984, 71% of such motions were granted).
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986), the Supreme Court failed to directly ad-
dress whether the first amendment mandates liberal use of summary proceedings. The Court only
vaguely referred to the Hutchinson dictum as "simply an acknowledgement of our general reluctance
'to grant special procedural protection to defendants in libel and defamation actions in addition to
the constitutional protection embodied in the substantive laws.' " Id. at 256 n.7 (citing Calder v.
Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984)).
Granting certiorari in Masson would permit the Supreme Court to address the practice ofprefer-
ential summary judgment in cases of defamation and would allow the Court to clarify its emerging
doctrine of procedural neutrality. For a discussion of this doctrine, see Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet,
Hepps and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. LJ. 1519,
1531-35 (1987).
33 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
34 Id. at 254-55 ("a trial judge must bear in mind the actual quantum and quality of proof neces-
sary to support liability under New York Times").
35 Id. at 252.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Compare Masson, (Ninth Circuit drew inferences and weighed credibility) with Zerangue v. TSP
Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d 1066, 1072 (5th Cir. 1987) (Fifth Circuit refused to draw inferences or
weigh the credibility of the evidence when reviewing a defendant motion for summaryjudgment in a
defamation action).
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III. The Masson Test for Actual Malice in Direct Quotation
The Ninth Circuit found no Supreme Court guidance for determin-
ing actual malice in cases of direct quotations. It also noted that the issue
was one of first impression in the Ninth Circuit. Consequently, the court
drew upon decisions from other circuits in outlining three principles for
determining actual malice.39 First, the court held that a factfinder may
find malice from a fabricated quotation "when the language attributed to
the plaintiff is wholly the product of the author's imagination." 40 Sec-
ond, with respect to ambiguous statements, "malice will not be inferred
from evidence showing that the quoted language does not contain the
exact words used by the plaintiff provided that the fabricated quotations
are . . . 'rational interpretations' of ambiguous remarks."' 4 1 Third, with
respect to unambiguous statements, "malice will not be inferred from
evidence showing that the quoted language does not. . . 'alter the sub-
stantive content' of unambiguous remarks actually made."42
These three principles form the basis of the test the Ninth Circuit
applied to the quotations in Masson. The Ninth Circuit's test for deter-
mining actual malice in instances of direct quotation is inappropriate for
three reasons. First, the cases on which the test depends are of limited
relevance. They do not directly address the issue present in Masson. Sec-
ond, the test incorrectly expands the definition of actual malice beyond
that provided by the Supreme Court. Lastly, technological advances and
current journalistic practice render the sweeping protection offered de-
fendants (primarily the media) unnecessary.
A. Masson:' Case Law Support
Perhaps the most important reason why the Masson court's test ulti-
mately proves faulty is that the court draws support from cases which are
not applicable to the issue in Masson. The case cited by the Ninth Circuit
that presents facts closest to those in Masson is Carson v. Allied News Com-
pany.43 In Carson, ajournalist wrote an article about the apparent dispute
between entertainer Johnny Carson and the National Broadcasting Com-
pany (NBC) over moving Carson's television show, "The Tonight
Show," from New York to Los Angeles. 44 The article included fabricated
direct quotations. 45 The journalist based the story on a previously pub-
lished article by another writer that contained incorrect facts. 46 The de-
39 Masson, 881 F.2d at 1453-56.
40 Id. at 1455-56 (citing Carson v. Allied News Company, 529 F.2d 206, 213 (7th Cir. 1976)).
41 Id. at 1456 (citing Dunn v. Gannett N.Y. Newspaper, Inc., 833 F.2d 446, 452 (3d Cir. 1987)).
42 Id. (citing Hotchner v. Castillo-Puche, 551 F.2d 910, 914 (2d Cir. 1977)).
43 Carson, 529 F.2d at 210-12.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 212. The article reported the supposed struggle between Carson and NBC executives
and contained "supposed quotations by Carson to the executives and their responses and reac-
tions." Id. Carson testified that he personally had no conversations with executives regarding the
show's move westward. Id.
46 Id. at 210. The previously published article offered speculation regarding Carson's motiva-
tions for moving the show to Los Angeles. Among the reasons, the article pointed to the fact that
Carson had been dating Ms. Joanna Holland, who resided in Los Angeles. Id. In fact, Ms. Holland
did not live anywhere in California. Id. at 211. This false fact became the entire focus of the defend-
ant's article, published in the NATIONAL INSIDER. Id.
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fendant-writer stated that the quotations used were actually the "logical
extension of what must have gone on from the facts that I read from the
[previously published] article." 47
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the determination of actual malice and
noted that by "fabricating and imagining 'facts', the defendant necessarily
entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the statements. ' 48 This
statement is significant because in concluding that a defendant who de-
liberately fabricates a quote necessarily does so with actual malice, Carson
limits a judge's discretion to grant summary judgment for a defendant
due to the absence of actual malice. This fact is crucial to the Masson
court's limited application of Carson.
To avoid the inflexible result advocated in Carson, the Masson court
distinguished Carson by limiting its application to cases where the lan-
guage attributed to the plaintiff is "wholly the product of the author's
imagination." 49 The Ninth Circuit failed to apply the Carson holding to
the disputed quotes in Masson but did not explain why the words that
Masson alleged he never spoke were not "wholly the product" of author
Janet Malcolm's imagination.50
After limiting Carson's application, the court constructed an analysis
for actual malice that drew a distinction between alteration of ambiguous
statements and unambiguous statements. While ambiguity is relevant to
the issue of actual malice, 5' the Masson court's distinction as to falsified
quotations is unjustified. The cases cited by the Ninth Circuit provide no
support for such a distinction.
1. Direct Quotation from Unambiguous Statements
The Masson court interpreted the Second Circuit's opinion in Hotch-
ner v. Castillo-Puche52 as standing for the proposition that fictionalized
quotations stemming from unambiguous statements may only constitute
actual malice if they alter the substantive content of the statements.53
Hotchner dealt with the English-language translation of a book about Er-
47 Id. at 212-13.
48 Id. at 213 (emphasis added). The court also noted that "[o]ne cannot fairly argue his good
faith or avoid liability by claiming that he is relying on the reports of another if the latter's statements
or observations are altered or taken out of context." Id. (citing Goldwater v. Ginzburg, 414 F.2d
324, 337 (2d Cir. 1969) (dealing with a defendant that added innuendos to some quoted statements
and quoted other statements out of context)).
49 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 881 F.2d 1452, 1455-56 (9th Cir. 1989).
50 For example, Masson asserts that he did not make many of the statements attributed to him in
the article. In one instance, the writer describes in great detail a conversation in which Masson
refers to himself as an intellectual gigolo. Id. at 1456. See also id at 1469 n.4 (Kozinski, J., dissent-
ing). See infra notes 93-97 and accompanying text for a discussion of this disputed quote. The story
places this conversation at the Chez Panisse restaurant in Berkeley, California. Id. at 1456. Masson
asserts he never made this statement. Id. Malcolm denied that the quote was fabricated, but later
conceded that the statement did not occur as the story portrayed, but rather occurred during a
conversation with Masson in New York. Id. This appears to be an instance where both the words
spoken in the quote and the quote's factual background were the product of the author's
imagination.
51 See infra notes 66-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of ambiguity in the context of
actual malice.
52 551 F.2d 910 (2d Cir. 1977).
53 Alasson, 881 F.2d at 1454 (citing Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 914.).
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nest Hemingway written by a Spanish writer who knew Hemingway. At
issue were six unfavorable statements about Hotchner (a purported
friend of Hemingway's) that the writer attributed to Hemingway. 54 In
translating the book, the publisher, Doubleday & Co., decided to "tone
down" one certain disparaging quotation contained in the original Span-
ish-language version.55
In determining whether actual malice existed in Hotchner, the Second
Circuit initially focused on the original disparaging quotation contained
in the Spanish-language version. It held that Doubleday did not enter-
tain serious doubt as to the veracity of Castillo-Puche's original account
of Hemingway's comments concerning Hotchner. Therefore, as to the
original Spanish-language statement, Doubleday did not publish with ac-
tual malice. 56 The court conceded that Doubleday had altered the quota-
tion but determined that the change did not "increase the defamatory
impact or alter the substantive content" of the actual statement.57
In Masson, the Ninth Circuit interpreted this case as holding that
changes to a quotation not altering the quote's substance are not made
with actual malice.58 The difficulty in trying to interpret the Hotchner
opinion is that the court's dictum is ambiguous. The Second Circuit's
main focus was whether Doubleday had reason to believe that the origi-
nal, Spanish quote was published with actual malice. After deciding that
Doubleday did not have such a reason to believe, the court dismissed the
issue of the altered, English-language quote in one short paragraph. A
better construction of Hotchner suggests that the Second Circuit declined
to hold Doubleday liable for fabricating the quotation because the
change was not defamatory. 59 The Second Circuit reasoned that if
Doubleday could not be liable for p'ublishing the original disparaging
quotation it could not be liable for making -the passage less offensive. 60
Specifically, the Second Circuit held that Doubleday would not be liable
simply because it published a bowdlerized version of the actual state-
ment.61 The use of "bowdlerized" 62 in place of a word such as "altered"
or "fabricated" indicates that the Second Circuit was limiting a writer's
ability to change words in a quote to words not defamatory. Herein lies
the two key distinctions between Hotchner and Masson. First, the disputed
54 Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 912. Doubleday originally identified I 1 statements they thought should
be eliminated or toned down. As published, the English translation contained six passages that a
jury ultimately found to have been published with actual malice. Id
55 "As originally translated, Hemingway's words were: '[Hotchner is] dirty and a terrible ass-
licker. There's something phony about him. I wouldn't sleep in the same room with him.'" Id. at
914. The English-language translation phrased the quotation as Hemingway stating "I don't really
trust him, though." Id at 912.
56 Id. at 914. The issue regarding actual malice on the part of Doubleday & Co. was whether
they recklessly disregarded the probability that the original Spanish version of the quote was false.
The issue of whether Castillo-Puche reported the quotations with actual malice was largely moot
because Castillo-Puche was dismissed from the suit for lack of personal jurisdiction. Id. at 912 n.4.
57 Id. at 914.
58 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 881 F.2d 1452, 1454 (9th Cir. 1989).
59 See Hotchner, 551 F.2d at 914.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Bowdlerize means "to remove matter considered indelicate or otherwise objectionable from
[sic] by expurgation or alteration." WEBsTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 262 (1986).
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quotes in Masson are fundamentally different than those in Hotchner. In
Hotchner, there was an actual quotation against which the court could first
evaluate falsity and defamatory impact independently of the issue of ac-
tual malice. In Masson, many of the allegedly fabricated quotations
sprung from the general tenor of actual statements or were composite
statements drawn from numerous statements actually made.63 Either
way, the quotes in Masson, unlike those in Hotchner, provided no defini-
tive starting point from which a court could measure falsity or defama-
tory impact. The second distinguishing factor is the nature of the
quotes. In Hotchner the altered quote was undisputably less offensive
than the actual quote. In Masson, this is not the case.64 To read Hotchner
as permitting a defendant to change a quotation and make it defamatory
with impunity goes directly against the Second Circuit's holding.6 5
2. Direct Quotation from Ambiguous Statements
To determine whether altering ambiguous quotes constituted actual
malice, the Ninth Circuit relied upon Supreme Court dictum found in
Time v. Pape.66 However, Pape's facts limit its relevance to Masson. In
Pape, the Court stated that lower courts should not infer malice where
the disputed writing was "one of a number of possible rational interpre-
tations of a document that bristled with ambiguities."-67 Pape dealt with
the publication in Time magazine of excerpts from the United States
Commission on Civil Rights' report on police brutality.68 The report
contained condensed summaries of individual cases of police brutality. A
general introduction prefaced the individual case summaries by explain-
ing that some case reports were factual while others were based solely on
allegations contained in complaints. 69 One particular summary ex-
cerpted in the Time article was based solely upon allegations-as op-
posed to a combination of facts and allegations-but Time failed to point
this out. The issue in Pape was whether, by failing to note that the brutal-
ity in question was only alleged, Time defamed the police officer men-
tioned in the report.70 The Court declined to find malice because the
report's general introduction was very ambiguous and it was not clear
whether the individual summaries represented facts or mere
allegations. 7'
63 See, e.g., Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 881 F.2d 1452, 1458 (9th Cir. 1989).
64 See generally id. at 1456-62 (review of the disputed quotes).
65 Note also that Hotchner addressed a jury finding of malice, not a disposition by summary
judgment.
66 401 U.S. 279 (1971).
67 Id. at 290. See also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 512,
513 (1984) (no malice where the "adoption of the language chosen was 'one of a number of possible
rational interpretations' of an event 'that bristled with ambiguities' and descriptive challenges for the
writer.")
68 Pape, 401 U.S. at 280-81.
69 Id. at 286-87.
70 .1lasson contained similar allegations of misleading editing, however, these particular quota-
tions were evaluated by the Ninth Circuit independently of the other quotations and not under the
same test. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 881 F.2d 1452, 1462 (9th Cir. 1989).
71 The general introduction to the individual reports of brutality stated:
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To support its use of the Pape dictum to quotations,72 the Masson
court cited Pape's similar application in Dunn v. Gannett New York Newspa-
pers.73 Dunn involved statements made by the mayor of Elizabeth, New
Jersey, criticizing recent Hispanic immigrants for contributing to the
city's litter problem.74 A local Spanish-language newspaper reported the
mayor's statement under a headline stating that the mayor called the
city's Hispanics "cerdos. '"75 The word cerdos was in quotation marks. The
mayor argued that cerdos meant pigs and the quotation marks implied
that he actually called the Hispanic community pigs. 76 In declining to
find actual malice 77 the court noted there was no literal Spanish transla-
tion for the relatively new American words "litterbug," "litter," or "lit-
terer."7 Additionally, it noted that cerdos also refers to dirty or slovenly
people and was a rational interpretation of the term litterbug.79
The context in which both the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit
applied the Pape "rational interpretation" dictum suggests that it is rele-
vant only when the inaccuracy surrounds some inherent ambiguity.
Thus, the doctrine was correctly applied when a source document was
inherently confusing (Pape), when language translation was complex
(Dunn), and when attempting to describe the movement of sound
(Bose). 80 In such cases, the inherent ambiguity prevents the writer from
forming the requisite intent necessary for finding actual malice. How-
ever, in Masson, the Ninth Circuit offered no reasoning as to why direct
quotations are inherently ambiguous. While all transmission of speech is
subject to misinterpretation, Pape should be read as requiring something
more to justify applying such a relaxed standard of accuracy. Courts
seeking to extend Pape to new factual situations must explain why the
particular speech in question is inherently ambiguous. The Ninth Circuit
In the text of this chapter the Commission briefly describes the alleged facts in 11 typical
cases of police brutality. They are presented in the belief that they contribute to an under-
standing of the problem. The allegations of misconduct are supported in several cases by
criminal convictions or findings by impartial agencies; in others, by sworn testimony, affida-
vits from eyewitnesses, or by staff field investigations. In no case has the Commission de-
termined conclusively whether the complaints or the officers were correct in their
statements. This is the function of a court. The Commission is of the opinion, however,
that the allegations appeared substantial enough to justify discussion in this study.
Pape, 401 U.S. at 287 (quoting 5 United States Commission on Civil Rights,Jstice (1961)).
The Court found this introduction "extravagantly ambiguous" as to what level of credence
should be placed on the condensed reports. Id.
72 As additional support for Pape, the Ninth Circuit also cites Bose Corp. v. Consumer's Union of the
United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485 (1984). The ambiguity in Bose related to the critical review of loud-
speakers manufactured by the plaintiff. The dispute surrounded a metaphor that the reviewer used
to describe the wandering of the sound emanating from the speakers. The Court determined that
the movement of sound from loudspeakers was an ambiguous event and, based on Pape, the inaccu-
racy in the defendant's description was not sufficient to constitute actual malice. Id at 512-13.
73 833 F.2d 446 (3d Cir. 1987).
74 Id. at 448.
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 The court held that the determination of actual malice would be based upon the Spanish word
and not the English translation offered by the mayor. Id. at 452.
78 Id. at 451.
79 Id. at 451 n.2. The court also noted that in the Spanish language, quotation marks do not
necessarily represent direct quotations. Id. at 451.
80 See supra note 72 for a discussion of the facts in Bose.
1990]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
offered no explanation as to why a magazine interview, conducted over
an extended period of time, required such a relaxed standard of accu-
racy. Permitting a "rational interpretation" standard for direct quotation
conflicts with the very purpose of quotation which is to present to the
reader the writer's exact words.8 1
3. Case Law: Conclusion
By limiting the application of Carson and then creating a distinction
between altering ambiguous and unambiguous quotations, the Masson
court constructs a test with a suspect foundation that ultimately produces
an incorrect result. The strained application of Hotchner and Dunn, where
the courts declined to find actual malice, and the unexplained narrow
interpretation of Carson, where malice was upheld, suggests that the
Ninth Circuit crafted its test with an eye toward a desired outcome. The
suggestion that the court created a test designed to facilitate the granting
of summary judgment for defendants appears more plausible in light of
the test's expanded definition of actual malice.
B. Masson: Expansion of the Actual Malice Standard
The second flaw in the Masson test is its expansion of the actual mal-
ice standard. The actual malice requirement raises the question of
whether the defendant knowingly published a falsehood or recklessly dis-
regarded the possibility of falsity.8 2 The Masson court interpreted malice
more broadly when evaluating direct quotations.
While the Supreme Court has defined actual malice in terms of the
intent element,83 the Masson court expands the definition of actual malice
to include all of the main elements of the defamation cause of action.8 4
For example, whether a quote is a "rational interpretation" of a state-
ment or whether it "alters the substance" of the statement more accu-
rately raises a question of falsity or defamatory impact-not whether the
writer published the quotation with a particular intent or state of mind.
Falsity is an independent element of defamation, not a sub-element of
actual malice. 85 The Supreme Court has described the relationship be-
tween the elements of actual malice and falsity as one of practicality, 86
created because "evidence offered by plaintiffs on the publisher's fault in
adequately investigating the truth of the published statements will gener-
81 See supra note 2 for a discussion of the literary significance of the quotation mark.
82 See supra note 25 and accompanying text for a discussion of the actual malice standard.
83 See, e.g., Harte-Hanks Comm., Inc. v. Connoughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2685 & n.7 (1989) (not-
ing that actual malice is not to be confused with the concept of ill-will or bad motive. The Court
suggests that in instructing juries, confusion could be avoided by substituting for the term actual
malice a term such as "state of mind." (citing Westmoreland v. CBS, Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1170, 1172-
73 & n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1984)).
84 See supra note 19 and accompanying text listing the elements of the libel cause of action.
85 It is important to distinguish the element of falsity from that of actual malice. One may argue
that the requirement of knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity creates within the element of ac-
tual malice a sub-element of falsity that requires evaluation that is independent of the writer's intent.
Such a reading of actual malice finds little support in the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Harte-Hanks, 109
S. Ct. at 2684-86 (discussing actual malice solely in terms of a defendant's state of mind).
86 Philadelphia News, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 778 (1985).
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ally encompass evidence of the falsity of the matter asserted. '87 There is
a distinct difference between evidence that overlaps between two ele-
ments and the view that one element necessarily encompasses the other.
While this distinction may seem slight, Masson indicates that on summary
judgment its effect is most dramatic.
The Ninth Circuit applied its test by starting from the premise that
altering a quote is not necessarilyfalsifying a quote. As a result, the court
defines a two-step actual malice analysis: whether the defendant altered
the quote and whether the alteration is false (or defamatory).,8 Liberty
Lobby requires that ajudge bear in mind the heightened burden of proof
regarding actual malice that the plaintiff will bear at trial.8 9 However, the
plaintiff bears no such heightened burden at trial regarding the element
of falsity.90 Combining the elements of malice and falsity under the um-
brella of actual malice, as did the Masson court, has two detrimental im-
plications: first, the heightened burden of proof for actual malice is
improperly applied to the element of falsity; and second, as a result a
court will perform more searching examination of the evidence regard-
ing falsity on summary judgment than is otherwise required under the
Liberty Lobby analysis.
87 -Id (citing Keeton, Defamation and the Freedom of the Press, 54 TEx. L. REV. 1221, 1236 (1976)).
88 See infra notes 98-101 and accompanying text for an example of the analysis the court applied
to the quotes in Masson.
89 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
90 It is well settled that a plaintiff must prove actual malice by a heightened burden of proof.
New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285-86 (1964) (convincing clarity); Gertz v. Robert
Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974) (clear and convincing clarity). Some commentators advocate
extending this standard to all elements of the defamation cause of action. See, e.g., S. HALPERN, THE
LAW OF DEFAMATION, PRIVACY, PUBLICITY AND "MORAL RIGHTS" 382 (1988) (chart); Franklin & Bus-
sell, The Plaintiff's Burden In Defamation: Awareness and Falsity, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 825, 863-65
(1984). The concern is that a standard of proof less than clear and convincing will lead to jury error
and ultimately to self-censorship. This well-worn concern is, in this case, without merit. The infre-
quency with which defamation cases result injury verdicts, see supra, note 32, and the existing clear
and convincing standard for actual malice, render this concern insignificant. Also, the foundation on
which this argument rests is dubious at best. See, e.g., Firestone v. Time, Inc. 460 F.2d 712, 722 (5th
Cir. 1972) (Bell, J., concurring) (such a standard of proof was implicit in New York Times).
Proponents of this argument cannot look to the Supreme Court for support. The Court has
noted that most of its past constitutional defamation decisions have addressed the issue of actual
malice, not falsity. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 775. Hepps, however, addressed the question of whether the
plaintiff or the defendant had the burden of proving truth or falsity of a defamatory statement. The
case provided the Court an opportunity to articulate the requirements of the element of falsity.
While Hepps dealt with a private plaintiff, the Court also stated that a "public-figure plaintiff must
show the falsity of the statements at issue in order to prevail in a suit for defamation." Id. (citing
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 74 (1964) (interpreting Sullivan) and Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S.
153, 176 (1979)). In stating the law as to falsity, the Court placed the burden of proving falsity of a
statement with the plaintiff. The Court was silent, however, as to any heightened burden that may
exist. This is in noticeable. conirast to the Court's recitation of the law as to the element of actual
malice where the Court noted that a public-figure plaintiff must show actual malice with "convinc-
ing" or "clear and convincing" clarity. Hepps, 475 U.S. at 773. Recently, the Court explicitly de-
clined to address this dispute. See Harte-Hanks Comm. v. Connaughton, 109 S. Ct. 2678, 2682 n.2
(1989) (noting the debate over which standard of proof applied to the issue of falsity and expressing
no view on the issue).
Given the implications of Liberty Lobby, to read a heightened burden of proof into the element of
falsity (and presumably into the element of defamatory impact) would result in expanded judicial
review of the merits of defamation cases on summary judgment which would implicitly accomplish
an objective that the Court has explicitly rejected. See Calder v.Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984)
(refusing to extend special procedural protection to defendants in libel and defamation suits). See
also Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 268-69 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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The Ninth Circuit's review of the disputed quotes in Masson demon-
strates the flaw in its definition of actual malice. In its heightened review
of the evidence of actual malice, the Masson court failed to examine the
evidence offered as to the pivotal issue - whether Malcolm either know-
ingly or recklessly disregarded falsity.91 The court focused solely on
whether the quotations in question were false or defamatory. By doing
so, the court drew inferences, made credibility determinations, and
weighed evidence to Masson's detriment. The court violated the
Supreme Court's admonition that judges draw all inferences in favor of
the plaintiff-nonmoving party and not weigh the credibility of evidence. 92
The disputed "intellectual gigolo" quote from Masson illustrates this
point. In the published article, Malcolm quoted Masson, regarding an
affair with a graduate student, as stating:
She [the graduate student] said, '[w]ell it is very nice sleeping with
you in your room, but you're the kind of person who should never
leave the room - you're just a social embarrassment anywhere else,
though you do fine in your own room.' And, you know, in their way, if not
in so many words, Eissler and Anna Freud told me the same thing. They like me
well enough 'in my own room.' They loved to hear from me what creeps and dolts
analysts are. I was like an intellectual gigolo - you get your pleasure from him,
but you don't take him out in public. 9
Masson denies ever saying the italicized words. 94 The italicized words
never appear in Malcolm's tape recordings. 95 They do appear in Mal-
colm's interview notes which Masson asserts are also fabricated. 96 As the
Masson court noted, however, the following statement by Masson did ap-
pear on the tape recordings:
[Eissler and Anna Freud] felt, in a sense, I [Masson] was a private
asset but a public liability. They like me when I was alone in their
living room, and I could talk and chat and tell them the truth about
things and they would tell me. But that I was, in a sense, much too
junior within the hierarchy of analysis for these important training
analysts to be caught dead with me.97
The court held that the quote did not alter the substantive content of the
actual statement and noted that "[t]he descriptive term 'intellectual gig-
olo' as used in this context, simply means that Masson's views were pri-
vately entertaining, but publicly embarrassing to Freud and Eissler." 98
91 To illustrate, Malcolm tape-recorded most of what Masson said except some of his most dam-
aging statements (including the intellectual gigolo comment). Mfasson, 881 F.2d at 1468 n.7 (Kozin-
ski, J., dissenting). Also, Malcolm initially represented to her editor, and to the New York Times that
she had every quote by Masson on tape. Id. Malcolm also claimed to have handwritten notes of the
unrecorded statements but that they were destroyed. Id. All that she produced was a typed tran-
scription of the notes. Id. While the dissent noted that ajury could have reasonably inferred malice
from any of this evidence, the majority refused to address this evidence. Id.
92 See infra note 99.
93 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 881 F.2d 1452, 1456-57 (9th Cir. 1989).
94 Id. at 1457.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. (footnote omitted).
98 Id. (citing Masson v. New Yorker Magazine 686 F. Supp. 1396, 1400 (N.D. Cal. 1987)).
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Drawing such an inference against Masson was clearly inappropriate.9 9
The court also held the "intellectual gigolo" quote not defamatory based
upon "a fair reading of the quotation."1 00 This determination was also
an inappropriate inference for the court to draw.10'
99 See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) ("Credibility determinations, the
weighing of the evidence, and the drawing of legitimate inferences from the facts are jury functions,
not those of ajudge."). See also Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144; 158-59 (1970) ("On summary
judgment the inferences to be drawn from the underlying facts contained in [the moving party's]
materials must be viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion.") (citing
United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).
100 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 881 F.2d 1452, 1457 (9th Cir. 1989).
101 See supra note 99. Equally disturbing is the court's second basis for determining that the
quote was not defamatory. Over a strong dissent, the Masson court adopts for the Ninth Circuit the
controversial "incremental harm" branch of the "libel-proof" doctrine. Id. at 1457-58. But see id. at
1481-82 & n.21 (KozinskiJ., dissenting).
The libel-proof doctrine is a theory that, in defamation actions, certain plaintiffs are precluded
from recovery as a matter of law by virtue of a particularly bad reputation. The doctrine is used to
dismiss defamation actions upon summary judgment. The doctrine originated in an opinion in the
Second Circuit in 1975. See Cardillo v. Doubleday & Co., Inc., 518 F.2d 638, 639 (2d Cir 1975). The
incremental harm branch of the libel-proof doctrine focuses not on the plaintiff's bad reputation but
rather on the alleged defamatory statements. The court determines whether the disputed quotes
incrementally caused harm to the plaintiff's reputation, given the effect of the remainder of the
article. See Simmons Ford, Inc. v. Consumer's Union of the United States, 516 F. Supp. 742, 750
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("portion of the article challenged by plaintiffs [] could not harm their reputations
in any way beyond the harm already caused by the remainder of the article.").
By adopting both the theory and its corollary, the Ninth Circuit embraced a doctrine that is far
from accepted as sound constitutional theory. The main assumption of the doctrine is that even
were a libel-proof plaintiff able to demonstrate defamation with actual malice, they would only be
entitled to nominal damages. See Cardillo, 518 F.2d at 639 (plaintiff was libel proof "by virtue of his
life as a [sic] habitual criminal [that he would not] be able to recover anything other than nominal
damages."). Courts applying the doctrine subscribe to the belief that the first amendment requires a
defamation plaintiff to prove actual damages and precludes nominal damage awards. The Supreme
Court has never addressed the constitutionality of the libel-proof doctrine, nor has it ever decided
whether nominal damages are permitted under the first amendment. See PROSSER, supra note 29, at
845. Currently, the circuits are divided as to whether, and to what extent, the libel-proof doctrine
should be applied to defamation actions. Even the Second Circuit, where the doctrine originated,
has vacillated in its application of the doctrine. See Cardillo, 518 F.2d at 639 (libel proof by virtue of a
life of habitual criminality); Buckley v. Littell, 539 F.2d 882, 889 (2d Cir. 1976) ("The doctrine of
'libel proof' defendants that our Cardillo case enunciated is a limited, narrow one, which we will leave
confined to its basic factual context."); Guccione v. Hustler Magazine, 800 F.2d 298, 303 (2d Cir.
1986) (application of the libel proof doctrine extends beyond plaintiffs with criminal records); Her-
bert v. Lando, 781 F.2d 298, 311 & n.10 (2d Cir. 1986) (reciting the "incremental harm" branch of
the doctrine articulated in Simmons, but specifically declining to adopt the theory). The D.C. Circuit
has explicitly rejected both the doctrine and its corollary. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 746 F.2d
1563, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (opinion by then-Judge Scalia rejecting the libel proof doctrine and
specifically holding that the incremental harm branch of the theory is "fundamentally a bad idea, we"
are not prepared to assume that it is the law of the District of Columbia; nor is it part of the federal
constitutional law."), rev'd on other grounds, 477 U.S. 242 (1985). Other circuits have avoided the
question altogether. See Marcone v. Penthouse Int'l. Magazine For Men, 754 F.2d 1072, 1079 (3d
Cir. 1985) (the court "cannot say as a matter of law that [the plaintiff] was libel proof'!); Schiavone
Const. Co. v. Time, Inc., 847 F.2d 1069, 1081 (3d Cir. 1988) ("We will dQ what we did in Marcone
and decline to rule on the libel proof plaintiff doctrine.").
The Ninth Circuit's application of the incremental harm corollary in Masson causes additional
conflicts with other circuits. As the dissent in Masson notes, the incremental harm corollary
originated in a district court and no federal appellate court had previously adopted it. Masson, 881
F.2d at 1482 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., dissenting). In fact, the Second Circuit in Herbert v.
Lando, from which the Masson court drew support, declined to adopt the incremental harm corollary
in a case involving multiple instances of defamation. Herbert, 781 F.2d at 311 & n.10. Masson also
dealt with multiple allegations of defamation. Application of the libel proof doctrine has also been
rejected in defamation cases on summary judgment. Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, 814 F.2d 1066,
1074 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[S]ummaryjudgment is not an appropriate stage at which to resolve credibil-
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The court's tinkering with the definition of actual malice can be
viewed, in conjunction with its narrow reading of Carson, as an attempt to
expand a judge's ability to grant summary judgment for media defend-
ants. If the Ninth Circuit had held, as did the Second Circuit in Carson,
that deliberate alteration of quotations necessarily constituted actual
malice, a judge would have less discretion to grant summary judgment
for defendants.' 0 2 Masson illustrates this point.
Masson had submitted evidence that the quotes in dispute were de-
liberately altered. 0 3 For purposes of summary judgment, the court
should have reviewed this evidence for a material issue of fact while
drawing all inferences in favor of Masson.10 4 Such evidence of deliberate
alteration, combined with the assumption, for purposes of summary
judgment, that Masson did not make the disputed statements, would re-
quire a court to determine that a material issue of fact regarding actual
malice (knowledge or reckless disregard of falsity) did exist. By stating
that a deliberately altered quote is not actionable unless the misquota-
tion is also false, the Masson court created a second level of analysis in the
actual malice test. It invites judges to grant summary judgment for lack
of actual malice despite the fact that evidence may demonstrate that the
defendant had knowledge of falsity or recklessly disregarded the
probability of falsity.
As Carson suggests, there should be no distinction between altering a
quote and falsifying a quote because direct quotation marks represent
not only the speaker's message but his or her exact words. With respect
to the actual malice element, when the defendant moves for summary
judgment, it is proper for the court to consider only whether the falsifica-
tion was accomplished with an intentional or reckless state of mind and
whether plaintiff has offered sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable
jury finding that actual malice did exist. If a material issue of fact exists
as to the defendant's state of mind, the judge must deny the defendant's
motion.
Another flaw in the Masson test is that it encourages courts to make
factual determinations of falsity that transform the summary proceedings
into "a full-blown paper trial on the merits." Justice Brennan predicted
such an improper result in his dissent in Liberty Lobby.' 0 5 The test also
conflicts with the Supreme Court's apparent move toward procedural
neutrality.' 0 6 At a time when so many judges view summary judgment in
ity questions. The trial court did not err in reserving the question of whether [plaintiffs] were libel
proof for the jury.").
The libel-proof doctrine is another demonstration of courts' general hostility to defamation
plaintiffs and provides yet another facet of defamation law that requires Supreme Court attention.
For a good discussion of the libel-proof doctrine's shortcomings, see Note, Libel Proof Plaintifs -
Rabble Without a Cause, 67 B. U. L. REV. 993 (1987). But see Note, Libel-Proof PlaintifDoctrine, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1909 (1985); Annotation, Who is "Libel-Proof", 50 A.L.R. 4th 1257 (1986).
102 See supra notes 43-48 and accompanying text for a discussion of Carson.
103 See supra note 91 for a discussion of this evidence.
104 Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158-59 (1970).
105 Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 266-67 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
106 Id. at 256 n.7. See also id. at 257 n.l (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra note 32 for a discus-
sion of procedural neutrality.
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favor of defamation defendants as constitutionally required,10 7 such dis-
cretion to make findings of fact as to falsity is likely to lead courts to
grant summary judgment not upon the evidence in question but rather
because a particular judge prefers summary judgment in defamation
cases. The long term effects of the Masson court's test will include deny-
ing legitimately defamed plaintiffs access to the courts and virtually elimi-
nating the significance of a quotation mark.
C. Change in Technology
While the media has helped create some very well-known quotes in
the past,108 this practice need not be viewed as acceptable. More efficient
methods of capturing information and the current move toward fictional-
ized news reporting support strict protection of the integrity of direct
quotations.
Broad brush protection for journalists using direct quotations is not
necessary in the current age of television and videotape and audiotape
recording. For example, in less-sophisticated times, politicians did not
have press secretaries and would commonly trust reporters to write state-
ments for them.' 0 9 Times have changed. Also, with only pen and paper
at their disposal, immaterial inaccuracy by reporters in the past was ar-
guably more understandable. Prior to Sullivan, the libel laws acted as the
corresponding check on the media because there was no constitutional
privilege for libelous speech. The negative reaction to the Masson deci-
sion by members of the print media suggests that current editorial prac-
tices reflect the increased precision with which stories may be reported
and supports maintaining the strict use of direct quotations."10
The increased commercialization of the news media also indicates a
need to protect the strict use of direct quotations. As news reporting
becomes more profit-oriented, journalists are injecting more creativity
107 See supra note 32 for a discussion of this belief.
108 Los Angeles Times writer Thomas B. Rosenstiel offers this example:
Long-time former New York Times sportswriter Leonard Koppett recalls the real story
about the day Leo Durocher allegedly said 'Nice guys finish last.'
A reporter sitting with Durocher before a game had asked him why he couldn't be
nicer.
Durocher, who was managing the Dodgers, pointed across to Giant's manager Mel Ott.
'There's Mel Ott,' Durocher really said, Koppett was told later by the reporters there. 'He's
a nice guy, and he's in last place.'
In print it became nice guys finish last, and Durocher, far from quibbling, adopted it.
Rosenstiel, Wide Respect For Sanctity Of The Spoken Word; Most Newspapers Have Strict Rules On Quotes, Los
Angeles Times, Aug. 5, 1989, § 1, at 29, col. 1.
109 Id.
110 See supra note 5 for a discussion of current editorial standards. See also Masson v. New Yorker
Magazine, 881 F.2d 1452, 1485 (9th Cir. 1989) (KozinskiJ., dissenting) (noting the editorial policy
of The New Yorker magazine requires verbatim quotation).
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into their work. Composite depiction1 ' and fictionalized re-creation of
factual events" 12 are examples of such creative reporting.
The advance of technology, which has made accurate recording of
quotes easier, and the increased commercialization of the news industry,
which causes a blurring of fact and fiction, demonstrate the tension be-
tween the ability to report more precisely and the motivation to embel-
lish news reporting. This tension illustrates why the sweeping protection
for falsified quotations, implied in the Masson test, is not only unneces-
sary but also ill-advised.
IV. An Alternative to Masson
Any test for actual malice must begin with consideration for the in-
terest the test is designed to protect. While the interests protected by
the first amendment are many, the historic concern over infringement on
free speech has been one of governmental censorship and its resulting
impact on the preservation of democracy.' 1 3 From this base, the consti-
tutional protection of libelous speech has moved beyond matters of
political expression to matters of public interest.
Freedom of speech is not limitless, however, and the Supreme Court
has recognized certain classes of speech that are unworthy of constitu-
tional protection. 1 4 One such class of unprotected speech is the calcu-
lated falsehood. 115 While the Court's concern over falsehood is due in
part to its detrimental effect on democracy,i 1 6 fear of political subversion
is only one reason for not extending first amendment protection to calcu-
lated falsehood. As early as 1947, the Commission on Freedom of the
111 One infamous example of composite depiction wasJimmy "s World: 8-Year-Old Heroin Addict Lives
for a Fix, the Pulitzer-prize winning story about an eight year old heroin addict published in the
Washington Post. Amid pressure to provide specific information about Jimmy to District of Colum-
bia social workers, the writer, Janet Cooke admitted that no such individual existed and that Jimmy
was actually a composite of young addicts drawn from interviews with social workers. GooDWiN,
supra note 2, at 161-64. See also Masson, 881 F.2d at 1477 n.15 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
112 See, e.g., Goldman, Blurred Lines: TV Network News is Making Re-Creation a Form of Recreation, Wall
St.J., Oct 30, 1989, § A, at 1, col. 1. This article discusses the format of the new CBS News program
entitled "Saturday Night with Connie Chung" which planned to present a re-enactment of the sui-
cide of activist Abbie Hoffman. The show presents a conversation between Hoffman and his brother
shortly before his (Abbie's) death. The conversation in fact never took place. CBS pieced it together
from prior interviews by CBS News. Goldman chides the program for "further blurring the distinc-
tion between fiction and reality in T.V. News." Id. See also Goldman, NBC, Citing Viewer Confusion, to
Halt Use of Re-Enactments in News Programs, Wall St. J., Nov. 21, 1989, § B, at 6, col. 5.
113 See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 268-77 (1964) (discussing the Sedition Act
of 1798).
114 See, e.g., Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (obscenity); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (advocacy of illegal conduct).
115 See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 75 (1964).
116 Id. The Court referred to Reisman, Democracy and Defamation: Fair Game and Fair Comment I, 42
COL. L. REv. 1085, 1088-1111 (1942) [hereinafter Fair Comment I]. Reisman authored a series of
articles on the topic of democracy and defamation. See also Reisman, Democracy and Defamation: Control
of Group Libel, 42 COL. L. REV. 727 (1942) and Reisman, Defamation and Democracy: Fair Game and Fair
Comment 11, 42 COL. L. REV. 1282 (1942).
In Fair Comment I, Reisman examined the development of libel doctrine in Europe prior to the
outbreak of World War II. He noted that the Nazis effectively used defamation as a tool in their rise
to power in Germany. Fair Comment I, supra, at 1090. They used libel trials as propaganda events
and threatened their own opponents with libel suits as a means of intimidation. Id. at 1089.
Reisman also contends that the severity and impartiality with which England enforced its libel
laws served to "check the rise of demagogic fascism" in that country. Id. at 1090.
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Press recognized that the threat to free speech was increasingly non-gov-
ernmental." 7 The Commission identified such factors as the economic
interest of newspaper owners, the influence of advertisers, the interest in
increased circulation and the public's craving for entertainment as
threats to free speech." 8 News reporter Lyle Denniston has echoed
these same concerns: "the power groupie, the fame-driven person runs
through [the news] profession in great numbers. I don't think people
respect truth very much: they respect theater and they respect excite-
ment, but truth isn't a driving proposition anymore."1 9
The test for actual malice in direct quotation must be sufficiently
firm to protect the individual from calculated falsehood and its underly-
ing motivations while still providing for the interests of free speech. 20 A
review of traditional actual malice doctrine indicates that it provides such
protection, and that the Masson test, as articulated, is unnecessary.
A. Traditional Actual Malice Doctrine and Direct Quotations
The principal deficiency in the Masson test is that it complicates and
broadens the analysis of actual malice. Application of this test will further
weaken the significance of direct quotation and further blur the distinc-
tion between fact and opinion. Perhaps most significantly, the court cre-
ated a new test for a situation which did not warrant a new approach.
Although direct quotation is a distinct style of speech; it does not require
a special interpretation of actual malice. Accordingly, actual malice
should be analyzed in the same manner whether or not the speech is a
direct quote.
117 Berney, Libel and the First Amendment - A New Constitutional Privilege, 51 VA. L. REV. 1, 32 (1965)
(one of the first commentaries to analyze the Sullivan decision).
118 Id. at 33.
119 GOODWIN, supra note 2, at 164 (quoting Lyle Denniston, United States Supreme Court re-
porter for the Baltimore Sun).
120 Ironically, Masson defendant, Janet Malcolm, has provided a vivid example of how prevalent
this motivation may be in the journalism profession. While Masson's suit against Malcolm was still
pending, Malcolm authored another article criticizing the same practice' for which Masson was suing
her. The article recounted the relationship between convicted murderer Dr. Jeffrey MacDonald and
Joseph McGinniss, the author of the now-famous book FATAL VISION which recounts MacDonald's
crimes. MacDonald had cooperated with McGinniss with the impression that the book would portray
MacDonald sympathetically. Scardino, Appeals Court Turns Down Suit Against Author, New York Times,
Aug. 5, 1989, § 1, at 26, col. 1. The book actually portrayed MacDonald as a brutal killer. Id. Mac-
Donald sued McGinniss and the suit settled for $325,000. Id. In writing about the MacDonald -
McGinniss relationship, Malcolm astounded and amused the national media with an opening para-
graph that had tremendous relevance to the accusations made by Masson:
Every journalist who is not too stupid or too full of himself to notice what is going on
knows that what he does is morally indefensible. He is a kind of confidence man, preying
on people's vanity, ignorance or loneliness, gaining their trust and betraying them without
remorse. Like the credulous widow who wakes up one day to find the charming young man
and all her savings gone, so the consenting subject of a piece of non-fiction writing learns -
when the article or book appears - his hard lesson. Journalists justify their treachery in
various ways according to their temperaments. The more pompous talk about freedom of
speech and 'the public's right to know'; the least talented talk about art; the seemliest mur-
mur about earning a living.
Malcolm, Reflections: The Journalist and the Murderer (I - The Journalist), THE NEw YORKER, March 13,
1989, at 38.
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B. The Masson Dissent: An Alternative Test
The Second Circuit's analysis in Carson suggests that actual malice in
direct quotations may be examined under traditional defamation princi-
ples. Judge Kozinski, dissenting in Masson advocated an approach con-
sistent with Carson. The Judge offered a five-step inquiry into whether a
fabricated quotation is actionable:
(1) Does the quoted material purport to be a verbatim repetition of
what the speaker said?
(2) If so, is it inaccurate?
(3) If so, is the inaccuracy material?
(4) If so, is the inaccuracy defamatory?
(5) If so, is the inaccuracy the result of malice?' 21
For Kozinski, a negative response to any one of these questions on a
motion for summary judgment would prevent the case from going to a
jury. 122
This test essentially reflects the traditional analysis performed in
cases of defamation: analysis of falsity, defamatory impact, and malicious
intent. The only deviation is that the first three steps in this analysis ad-
dress the question of whether the quotation is false. A proper analysis of
falsity, however, is independent of the question of malice.' 23
While the Masson dissent would have the judge perform the entire
five-step inquiry on summary judgment, the extent of a court's review
would differ for each of the elements of defamation. Liberty Lobby man-
dates an expanded review of the plaintiff's evidence as to actual malice.
The same level of review is not appropriate for the elements of falsity
and defamatory impact. Ajudge should review these elements within the
context of traditional summary judgment procedure. Under this proce-
dure, the judge must first determine whether the defendant-moving
party has met his initial burden of proving that there does not exist a
genuine issue of material fact. 124 If the moving party meets this burden,
then the judge must determine whether the plaintiff-nonmoving party
has proven that such a question of material fact does exist.' 25 A judge
must perform such an analysis, however, while drawing all inferences in
favor of the plaintiff-nonmoving party. 126 Such analysis would suffi-
ciently protect the defendant's first amendment rights without establish-
ing a system in which it would be virtually impossible for a plaintiff with a
reasonable claim of defamation to prevail. Other circuits have also lim-
ited the impact of Liberty Lobby to the element of actual malice. 127
121 Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 881 F.2d 1452, 1478 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J.,
dissenting).
122 Id.
123 See supra note 85 and accompanying text for a discussion of the significance of this distinction.
124 FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c).
125 Id. at 56(e).
126 See supra note 99.
127 See, e.g., Zerangue v. TSP Newspapers, Inc., 814 F.2d 1066, 1071 (5th Cir. 1987) (specifically
noting that Liberty Lobby did not otherwise alter summary judgment procedure beyond the element of
actual malice).
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C. The Alternative Test and First Amendment Protection
Whether or not the Masson dissent's test is appropriate will depend
on whether it impermissibly chills speech or inhibits robust public de-
bate. 128 Substantively, the test does not appreciably differ from tradi-
tional defamation principles established by the Supreme Court.
Expanding the question of falsity into three parts does not lighten the
plaintiff's burden of proving all elements of defamation. Unlike the test
offered by the Masson majority, the dissent's test does not alter the defini-
tion of actual malice. The dissent's test does address the issue of falsity
and defamatory impact but not as sub-elements of actual malice.
As for procedural first amendment concerns, the dissent's analysis
does not provide defendants with additional procedural protection as the
majority's test implicitly does. 129 Although the Supreme Court has yet to
directly state whether the first amendment requires special procedure in
matters of defamation,1 30 in Liberty Lobby, the Court indicated that no
special procedures are required.13 1 The Court explicitly stated in Liberty
Lobby that its holding applied beyond the law of defamation.' 3 2 Conse-
quently, the fact that the dissent's alternative analysis fails to offer the
defendant additional procedural protection does not weaken its effective-
ness. No such protection is presently constitutionally required.
Even if the dissent's alternative test appears sound, it might be insuf-
ficient if it effectively restricts speech by causing media self-censor-
ship.1 33 Such concern is not warranted due to the type of speech
involved in Masson - direct quotation. The dissent's test affects neither
the content nor the frequency of speech but rather only the manner in
which the speech is presented.
If a writer has reason to doubt a statement's accuracy, there are
other ways to present it. First, the writer could use partial quotations.
Also the writer could paraphrase the statement and not use quotation
marks. Both alternative presentations signal to the reader the presence
of editorial judgment. The enhanced credibility inherent in direct quota-
tions is a function of the quotation's accuracy. The absence of accuracy
restricts the writer's right to the credibility gained by using direct quota-
tions.' 3 4 Such use of direct quotation should be reserved for those in-
stances when the requisite accuracy can be assured. This will not affect
128 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
129 See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
130 See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
131 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 256 n.7 (1986).
132 Id. at 254. See id. at 257 n.1 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
133 Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279.
134 The Masson dissent offered a good example of the added credibility due to direct quotations.
In reviewing the book IN THE FREUD ARCHIVES, a psychiatrist from Harvard University wrote:
Masson, the promising psychoanalytic scholar emerges gradually, as a grandiose ego-
tist - mean-spirited, self-serving, full of braggadocio impossibly arrogant and, in the end, a
self-destructive fool. But it is not Janet Malcolm who calls him such: his own words reveal this
psychological profile - a self portrait offered to us through the efforts of an observer and lis-
tener who is, surely, as wise as any in the psychoanalytic profession.
Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, 881 F.2d 1452, 1465 (9th Cir. 1989) (Kozinski, J., dissenting)
(citing Coles, Freudianism and [sic] its Malcontents, Boston Globe, May 27, 1984, § (Book Review), at
58, 60, col. 2 (emphasis added) (Freudianism Confronts its Malcontents)).
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the substance or the frequency of speech, just the form in which it is
presented. While a writer has a right to free speech, he does not neces-
sarily possess the right to the most effective form of speech.135
One additional concern is whether the alternative test will inhibit the
typically frenetic task of gathering and disseminating news to the public.
It will not. In such cases, sufficient protection for media defendants is
inherent in the heightened burden of proof regarding actual malice. To
be actionable, defamation of a public figure must be either intentional or
reckless. 13 6 A court will determine the existence of actual malice in light
of relevant factors such as the time constraint of publication. 137 This fac-
tor, known as the "hot news" exception, indicates that the necessity for
rapid dissemination is a factor in determining whether a defendant's ac-
tions will be elevated to the level of recklessness required for finding
actual malice.138 Because the ability to verify quotations is already rele-
vant in determining actual malice, the dissent's alternative analysis does
nothing to diminish this protection already afforded defendants in defa-
mation actions.
C. Alternative Test. Conclusion
The Masson dissent's analysis is simple and applies traditional defa-
mation principles within the framework of conventional summary judg-
ment procedures. It will not create a chilling effect on the first
amendment. In fact, the converse is true: the complexity and subjectiv-
ity inherent in the majority's test needlessly complicates the area of con-
stitutional defamation. The lenient standard that the Ninth Circuit
advocates for use of direct quotations will cause tremendous imprecision
in the communication of information. To hold writers to a "rational in-
terpretation" standard for direct quotation may cause public officials
and public figures to avoid making statements and giving interviews,
thereby effectively chilling the robust, uninhibited debate that the first
amendment is designed to protect. As Professor Keeton points out,
135 Admittedly, the form in which speech is presented is protected under the first amendment.
See Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989) (the act of burning an American flag is expressive
conduct within protection of the first amendment). The Supreme Court has explicitly stated, how-
ever, that such protection does not extend "the right to communicate one's views at all times and
places or in any manner that may be desired." Heffron v. Int'l. Society for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981). The constitutionality of a restriction on a form of speech will most
likely depend upon the existence of alternative modes of communication. City Council v. Taxpayers
for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 812 (1984). Accordingly, to restrict the use of direct quotations to in-
stances where accuracy can be assured does not impermissibly burden the first amendment right to
free speech due to the existence of alternative modes of communication such as partial quotation
and paraphrasing.
136 The same standard may not apply to private plaintiffs suing on a private matter. See Dun &
Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 761 n.7 (1985).
137 In deciding Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts and Associated Press v. Walker, 388 U.S. 130
(1967) (combined opinion), the Supreme Court addressed the relevance of time constraints on pub-
lication. In upholding the finding of malice in Butts but not in Walker, four members of the Court
focused on the immediacy of dissemination as a factor in determining actual malice. Id. at 156-59.
138 Id. at 158-59. See also Carson v. Allied News Co., 529 F.2d 206, 211 (2d Cir. 1976) ("the
[previously published] article appeared on February 28, 1972, and the NATIONAL INSIDER article on
April 9, 1972, almost six weeks later. The 'facts' allegedly relied on by the defendant from the
[previously published] article were not 'hot news.' ") (footnote omitted).
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neither the values protecting free speech nor those protecting one's rep-
utation are advanced in a system requiring a large. number of difficult
decisions.13 9 The subjectivity with which a judge determines falsity and
actual malice under the Masson court's test will provide little predictabil-
ity to potential future litigants. Moreover, it will not help reduce the
proliferation of expensive litigation unless judges display an open prefer-
ence for dismissing such suits through summary proceedings. This
would be an unjustified procedure brought on by a flawed test. In the
already vague area of constitutional defamation, an approach such as that
offered in Judge Kozinski's dissent in Masson appears more prudent than
that offered by the Masson majority.
V. Conclusion
Defamation continues to be a very confusing area of constitutional
law. The most significant flaw in the Masson decision is that the Ninth
Circuit needlessly adds to this confusion. The court began by noting that
the Supreme Court had never specifically addressed the issue of direct
quotation. It then applied cases with minimal relevance to the issues in
Masson. The court took these holdings and crafted a test for actual mal-
ice that deviated from principles of defamation and summary judgment
established by the Supreme Court. The resulting test is ambiguous,
complex, and biased in favor of defendants.
In noticeable contrast to the Masson court's test, the Masson dissent's
test is no test at all. Rather, it applies existing defamation principles
under standard summary judgment procedures. Such an approach is
simple, fundamentally sound and sufficiently protects the first amend-
ment. Its application will simplify and expedite defamation litigation.
The Ninth Circuit's controversial decision and Judge Kozinski's
thorough dissent indicate that Masson would, through further appellate
review, provide an opportunity to definitively answer many questions
that currently exist in the area of defamation. On February 15, 1990 the
Ninth Circuit denied Masson's petition for rehearing.140 Masson is likely
to petition the Supreme Court for certiorari. The Court should not de-
cline the opportunity to grant certiorari in Masson and to overturn the
Ninth Circuit's holding. In doing so, the Court must provide the circuits
with much needed guidance in understanding Liberty Lobby and the way in
which defamation cases should be reviewed on summary judgment. Such
guidance will help prevent the forced application of legal principles and
opportunistic interpretation of case law that led to the erroneous deci-
sion in Masson.
Scott C. Herlihy
139 Keeton, Defamation and Freedom of the Press, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1221, 1224 (1976).
140 Judges Alarcon and Hall voted to deny rehearing. Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Nos. 87-
2665, 87-2700 (9th Cir. February 15, 1990) (LEXIS, Genfed library, App file). The full court was
advised of the suggestion for rehearing en banc. Id. No judge requested a vote for rehearing the
matter en bane. Id.
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